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The aim of the study is to analyse Austro-papal relations in the period 1838–1848 in the 
context of the Italian liberal-national movement. The reactionary, backward, absolutist 
regime of the papal government had often been the cause of the crises in the Papal 
States in the pre-March period, with the most significant one being in 1831, when it was 
only through Austrian military intervention that the papal regime survived. The papal 
government was unwilling to change the course of its internal policy and transform 
the Papal States for the sake of both its subjects and its government. Therefore, when 
it came to reforming the papal regime, Metternich’s lifelong advising of the Pope was 
like beating a dead horse. Austria’s readiness to intervene militarily whenever requested 
by the Pope was the most important part of Metternich’s diplomatic passivity within 
his papal policy during the 1840s, although none of the local uprisings in this period 
required the intervention of Austrian troops. The change in the Austrian chancellor’s 
approach to Rome emerged because of the reform course of Pius IX, who was elected 
Pope in the summer of 1846. The Pope’s utter disinterest and opposition to Austria after 
1846 eventually resulted in the ultimate fall of Metternich’s papal policy.
[Austria; Papal States; Metternich; 19th Century; Papacy; Pius IX; Risorgimento]
Introduction
The reactionary, backward, absolutist regime of the papal government was 
often the cause of crises in the Papal States in the period 1815–1848. This 
central Italian state was administered only by ecclesiastical representa-
tives without the participation of laymen; subordination to the Church 
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out at the Department of Historical Sciences, Faculty of Arts, University of West 
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concerned the whole society. This fact created a social climate in which 
the higher classes, to which a certain degree of decision-making had 
been granted under French rule before 1815, often tried to gain a share 
in the state administration and to improve the conditions of their and 
other papal subjects. The greatest endeavour of this kind before 1848 was 
the revolution in 1831, which was only suppressed by Austrian military 
intervention. Not even this major political crisis forced the papal govern-
ment to change the course of its internal policy and introduce reforms 
that would transform the Papal States for the sake of its subjects.
The internal stability of the Papal States had been an important 
element of Austrian foreign policy, on account of either the Italian 
provinces of the Austrian Empire or Austria’s dominance over the penin-
sula. Therefore, the Austrian Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Klemens 
Wenzel Nepomuk  Lothar, Prince von Metternich-Winnerburg, made a lot 
of efforts to persuade Rome to introduce apolitical reforms that would 
satisfy the population and thus prevent revolution. His entire thirty-year 
effort, however, was completely useless, for reactionary thinking among 
the Roman cardinals was too strong. Until the death of Gregory XVI in 
1846, the papal government remained a symbol of reaction, backward-
ness and non-compliance with the spirit of the times. This perception 
changed with the advent of Pius IX and the introduction of moderate 
reforms. However, these reforms went far beyond what Metternich had 
been recommending all along. The reform measures he proposed were 
simply insufficient and outdated, and thus irrelevant to Italian society 
in the 1840s. This nonconformity was one of the reasons why Austrian 
influence declined significantly after 1846, and why Metternich’s papal 
policy was finally doomed.
Austro-papal relations in the period 1809–1838 were excellently 
analyzed by the American historian Alan J. Reinerman in his two-volume 
book: Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Between Conflict and 
Cooperation 1809–1830 and Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. 
Revolution and Reaction 1830–1838. Unfortunately, an analysis of relations 
between Rome and Vienna for the period 1838–1848 is still missing. The 
aim of the study is therefore to fill in this gap, although it is more of a brief 
outline, as the scope and complexity of the topic require more space than 
the limits of this article. For the same reason, it must also be said that 
the focus remains only on events in the Papal States in the context of the 
liberal-national movement.
169
D. Martínek, Austria and the Papal States
Austro-papal Relations until 1838
Throughout the whole pre-March period (the era from the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815 to the revolutionary year of 1848), Austro-papal relations 
had always been characterized by, among other things, one particular 
aspect: the persistent efforts of the Austrian Chancellor and Foreign Min-
ister of the Austrian Empire, Klemens von Metternich, to urge the Roman 
government to reform the papal regime.2 For Metternich, the existence 
and stability of the papal government was an important feature of his 
overall Italian policy, as well as a vital element in maintaining the Austrian 
Empire among the Great Powers, given the fact that Lombardy-Venetia – 
since 1815 an integral part of Austria – was one of the cornerstones of the 
Habsburg Empire’s superpower status at that time. Any change of the 
political status quo on the Apennine Peninsula could threaten the 
superpower status of Austria, while revolutions had the greatest potential 
for changing the political order. As they were less politically and socially 
developed areas of Europe, the Italian states were particularly vulnerable 
to revolutionary waves, and the dissatisfaction of the Italian popula-
tion with inefficient governments was persistent.3 The Papal States in 
particular, which at that time was probably the most backward state with 
the most absolutist regime on the peninsula, had to face several revolts in 
the first half of the 19th century.4 The Austrian chancellor was aware of the 
threat of potential revolutions in neighbouring Italian states, believing 
that – in the case of the papal administration – only the introduction of 
appropriate non-political reforms could minimize dissatisfaction among 
the subjects and thus eliminate the danger of future revolutions.5
Unfortunately, not only for the chancellor himself but also for the papal 
government, when it came to reforming the papal regime, Metternich’s 
2 Alan J. Reinerman, an American historian, devoted his lifelong research and excellent 
works to Austro-papal relations, especially in the pre-March period. For his article on 
Metternich’s efforts to reform the papal regime, see A. J. REINERMAN, Metternich and 
Reform: The Case of the Papal State 1814–1848, in: The Journal of Modern History, 42, 1970, 
4, pp. 524–548.
3 M. MERIGGI, State and Society in Post-Napoleonic Italy, in: D. LAVEN – L. RIALL 
(eds.), Napoleon’s Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe, Oxford, New 
York 2000, pp. 57–60; L. RIALL, Risorgimento. The History of Italy from Napoleon to the 
Nation-State, London 2009, pp. 53–67.
4 G. F.-H. BERKELEY, Italy in the Making: 1815 to 1846, Cambridge 1932, p. xviii; A. J. 
REINERMAN, Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich: Between Conflict and Coopera-
tion 1809–1830, Washington, D.C. 1979, pp. 127–128, 147–148.
5 REINERMAN, Metternich and Reform, pp. 526–527.
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lifelong advising was like beating a dead horse. The reactionary wing of 
the Roman government, the so-called Zelanti, was so unwilling to dispose 
of their traditional rights, privileges and influence in the 1815–1846 
period, that they did not allow the introduction of any reforms, which 
they saw as a danger to the Pope’s temporal power. However, it was the 
reactionary policy of the Roman government that was grist to the mill for 
liberal and democratic intellectuals, who could take advantage of the bad 
tempers in society and thereby provoke an anti-regime uprising. This was 
the case with the local riots in the years following the Congress of Vienna 
and during the 1820s, as well as in the 1831 revolution and the disorders 
of the following months.6
As for the revolution of 1831 and the turbulent developments in 
the following months in the Papal States, these events were no surprise 
to Metternich. Having failed in all his efforts to modernize the papal 
administration, he was aware that any slight impulse would ignite 
a revolutionary fire. This stimulus came in July 1830, when a political coup 
took place in Paris, and the more liberal government of Louis Philippe was 
established. At that time, Metternich was prepared to help the Pope not 
only politically, but also militarily, if necessary. After all, the preservation 
of the political status quo in all neighbouring states was an important fac-
tor in maintaining Austrian rule in Lombardy-Venetia and her dominance 
on the Apennine Peninsula.7
And so it also happened a few weeks after the outbreak of revolution 
in the northern provinces of the Papal States, the so-called Legations, 
in early February 1831, that a nearly two-month-long conclave created 
a political vacuum that was used by liberal groups to take control in the 
provinces. Within a few days, Legations were excluded from the Pope’s 
power, and a central provisional government was established in Bologna, 
one which was not even afraid to go one step further and promulgate 
a preliminary constitution.8 The Roman government was unable to 
resolve the situation on its own – the papal troops were small in number, 
6 Ibid., pp. 547–548.
7 For Austrian hegemony, though weak, on the Apennine Peninsula, see M. ŠEDIVÝ, 
The Decline of the Congress System: Metternich, Italy and European Diplomacy, London, New 
York 2018, pp. 145–169.
8 L. PÁSZTOR – P. PIRRI (ed.), L’archivio dei governi provvisori di Bologna e delle Provincie 
Unite del 1831, Cittá del Vaticano 1956, pp. 323–328; A. J. REINERMAN, Austria and 
the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Revolution and Reaction 1830–1838, Washington, D.C. 
1989, pp. 10–21.
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as most of the soldiers joined the rebels – and so, after a brief diplomatic 
sounding, the Pope decided to ask the Austrian Emperor for military 
intervention.9 For Metternich, for whom the outbreak of revolution 
was no big surprise, as he was well informed of the riots that had been 
occurring in the Papal States even in broad daylight since the summer of 
1830, the Pope’s official request for Austrian military assistance was all he 
needed to make the intervention a reality. In fact, in the autumn of 1830 
he had already expressed to the Pope the readiness of the Austrian Empire 
to intervene, if required, in the Papal States.10 The Pope’s invitation letter 
to Francis I was, for Metternich, the legal basis for the Austrian military 
action in central Italy in March 1831.
Following the successful suppression of revolution by Austrian troops, 
an informal diplomatic conference was convened in Rome, which was 
to determine the further development of the Papal States. In particular, 
three main issues were about to be discussed: the evacuation of Austrian 
troops, an amnesty for the rebels, and the reform of the papal regime.11 
This diplomatic meeting of the representatives of the five great powers 
– the “European Concert” – was the first occasion in European history 
for discussion on the so-called Roman Question, the question of the 
temporal power of the popes as rulers of a civil territory.12 Unfortunately 
for Metternich, given the current dramatic situation in the Papal States, 
the conference did not bring the results he had wished for. The evacuation 
of Austrian troops became the main agenda of the conference; this was 
a success for the French ambassador, since the government in Paris fun-
damentally refused any increase in Austria’s influence in Rome.13 After all, 
the centuries-long struggle between Austria and France for influence in 
the Italian states is a story that resumed soon after the Congress of Vienna, 
9 F. ENGEL-JANOSI, Die politische Korrespondenz der Päpste mit den Österreichischen Kaisern 
1804–1918, Wien, München 1964, pp. 199–200; A. J. REINERMAN, Austria and the 
Papacy II, pp. 21–34.
10 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 24. 11. 1830, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (hence-
forth: OeStA), Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (henceforth: HHStA), Staatskanz-
lei (henceforth: StK), Rom 38.
11 N. NADA, L’Austria e la questione romana dalla Rivoluzione di Luglio alla fine della Conferenza 
diplomatica romana. Agosto 1830–luglio 1831, Torino 1953, pp. 90–103; A. J. REINER-
MAN, Austria and the Papacy II, pp. 21–34; A. J. REINERMAN, The Concert Baffled. The 
Roman Conference of 1831 and the Reforms of the Papal State, in: The International 
History Review 5, 1983, 1, pp. 20–38.
12 REINERMAN, Austria and the Papacy II, p. 48.
13 Ibid., p. 79.
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and especially since the early 1830s. With the advent of the more assertive 
foreign policy of the July Monarchy, the Apennine Peninsula became an 
arena for the geopolitical interests of these two powers.14
After a few weeks of negotiations, a memorandum was finally drawn up 
which took into account some of the rebels’ demands and attempted to 
reorganize the administration of the Papal States.15 Both Pope Gregory 
XVI and his Secretary of State, Tommaso Bernetti, agreed to implement 
the reforms, but their activity in this respect was insufficient, and in the 
coming months the liberals in the provinces were again expressing their 
dissatisfaction. During the following six months, although the northern 
provinces were under the nominal rule of the Pope, the reality was dif-
ferent. Those who had joined the rebels in February were now in leading 
positions in the administration and army. At the end of the year, the 
situation was so intolerable for the government in Rome that the Austrian 
troops, who had to leave the Legations under pressure from the French 
government in mid-July 1831, re-entered the Papal States once again at 
the request of Gregory XVI in January 1832.16
This time, however, the French government did not assume the role of 
passive bystander and took military action. The French occupation of the 
papal port city of Ancona occurred at the end of February 1832. With this 
move, the French government wanted to counter Austrian influence in 
the Papal States, even though it did so without the consent of the Pope 
and thus completely illegally.17 Despite the Pope’s disagreement, the 
dual occupation of the Papal States lasted until 1838, when the Austrian 
troops left Bologna and the French did the same in Ancona.18 Due to the 
presence of foreign troops in the period 1832–1838, liberal-national 
groups had little chance to organize any hostilities against the papal 
government. In an environment where the Roman government did not 
have to be concerned about the potential outbreak of riots, Metternich 
14 ŠEDIVÝ, pp. 12, 94, 250.
15 BERKELEY, pp. 103–108; F. J. COPPA, The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence, 
London, New York 1992, p. 17; REINERMAN, Austria and the Papacy II, pp. 58–59.
16 Gregory XVI to Francis I, Rome, 2. 1. 1832, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 47; ENGEL-
JANOSI, pp. 208–210.
17 REINERMAN, Austria and the Papacy II, pp. 109–128; M. ŠEDIVÝ, Francouzská okupace 
Ancony v roce 1832 a její ohlas v Evropě, in: Moderní dějiny, 24, 2016, 2, pp. 74–88.
18 M. GAVELLI – O. SANGIORGI, L’aquila su San Petronio. Esercito austriaco e società bolognese 
1814–1859, Bologna 1995, pp. 14–15; REINERMAN, Austria and the Papacy II, p. 323; 
F. WOLFRAM, Besetzung und Räumung Ankonas durch Frankreich 1832–1838, unpub-
lished dissertation, Universität Wien 1930, pp. 152–153.
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restarted his persistent efforts to force the papal government to introduce 
reforms.
His greatest attempt to secure reforms in the Papal States was the 
deployment of Lombard official Giuseppe Maria Sebregondi, the Delegate 
of Mantua and an experienced administrator in the service of Austria, 
whose task was to support the Roman government in finding suitable 
non-political reforms and assisting the government in their implementa-
tion. Although Sebregondi spent more than three years in Rome, his 
mission completely failed, for the resistance to any reforms within the 
Roman government was too strong. After Sebregondi’s failure, Metternich 
slowly lost hope that the papal government could be saved and that it was 
safe to withdraw Austrian troops from the Legations, thereby making the 
French leave Ancona.19
Metternich’s advice was not heard throughout the 1830s, and the 
situation was no different even with a new Secretary of State in 1836, 
when Luigi Lambruschini, a former Papal Nuncio in Paris, became the 
Pope’s “prime minister”. Lambruschini was ranked among the reactionary 
cardinals of Zelanti and his ultraconservative positions were well known 
in diplomatic circles; after all, the vigorous defence of the Church against 
Orleanism had cost him his place at the nunciature in Paris. He considered 
Austria to be Rome’s closest ally, but that did not change his policy of 
not following the chancellor’s instructions. On the contrary, not only did 
he pursue an entirely independent internal policy unaffected by foreign 
powers, he also advocated the acceleration of the evacuation of foreign 
troops from papal territory.20 In any case, the election of Lambruschini as 
the Secretary of State was a significant blow to Metternich’s papal reform 
policy. During the years leading up to 1846, as Lambruschini left the office 
and the new Pope was elected, the Austrian chancellor maintained the 
position of a rather passive observer, without trying to influence the Ro-
man government and perhaps only occasionally commenting on events 
taking place in the papal provinces.
Austro-papal Relations in 1838–1848
After 1838, it took some time for liberal-national groups in the provinces 
of the Papal States to remobilize. The presence of Austrian troops in the 
19 N. NADA, Metternich e le riforme nello Stato Pontificio. La missione Sebregondi a Roma 
(1832–1836), Torino 1957; REINERMAN, Austria and the Papacy II, pp. 178–200.
20 REINERMAN, Austria and the Papacy II, pp. 300–325.
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Legations led to the repression of the activities of Young Italy and other 
secret societies, with only minor street disturbances occurring during 
this period. After the departure of the Austrians, political and conspiracy 
activities began to gain momentum again, and the contacts of liberal-
national groups were being re-established between Bologna, Romagna, 
and Marche. However, it took several years for them to resort to open re-
sistance to the papal regime, and in August 1843, in the town of  Savigno, 
in the Apennines about 25 kilometres from Bologna, the gendarmes and 
papal volunteers were attacked by the local rebels led by the brothers 
Pasquale and Saverio Muratori. The armed clash ended with the defeat 
of the papal troops, some of whom were killed (among them the captain 
of the unit himself) and others taken prisoner. But when the insurgents 
learned of the arrival of regular troops, they decided to escape through 
the hills of the Apennines. Chased by papal troops, they were eventually 
captured and the majority of them were arrested after a short fight.21 
Some of them succeeded in fleeing abroad, passing Tuscany to Livorno 
and from there to France, as in the case of Pasquale Muratori. A special 
military commission was set up to judge the detainees in Bologna; some 
of them were sentenced to death, while others were put into prison.22
The riots in Savigno were not the only anti-regime activities of liberal-
national groups in 1843. At the end of July, a conspiracy involving the 
members of Young Italy, who planned to provoke a revolt against local 
papal representatives, was discovered in Bologna. In early September, 
a group of more than 150 Bolognese insurgents marched towards Castel 
Bolognese near Imola, with the intention of capturing three high papal 
representatives who were holding negotiations there: Luigi Amat, Legate 
of Ravenna, Chiarissimo Falconieri, Archbishop of Ravenna, and Gio-
vanni Mastai Ferretti, bishop of Imola and future Pope Pius IX. However, 
the papal officials had been warned in time and were able to take refuge 
in Imola, and the rebels found only an abandoned building upon their 
arrival.23 The papal soldiers captured most of the rebels with the help 
of peasants loyal to the Pope, and the majority of them were sentenced
21 Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 22. 8. 1843, 26. 8. 1843, 28. 8. 1843, Archivio Segreto 
Vaticano, (henceforth: ASV) Rome, Archivio della nunziatura apostolica in Vienna 
(henceforth: Vienna) 281P.
22 Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 31. 1. 1844, ASV, Vienna 281Q; Ohms to Metternich 
31. 8. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.
23 Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 18. 9. 1843, ASV, Vienna 281P; Ohms to Metternich 
14. 9. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.
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to harsh punishments.24 Nevertheless, as in the case of Savigno, some were 
able to flee into exile. Among the exiles was Luigi Carlo Farini, a young 
doctor from Russi, participant in the revolution of 1831 and future 
President of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Italy.25
These anti-regime endeavours in the summer of 1843 were neither 
a surprise to the papal government, nor anything that its local regular 
troops could not handle. In the weeks before the disturbances in Bologna 
at the end of July, the papal troops in the city were reinforced, measures 
were taken to improve the surveillance of the population, and some indi-
viduals were even arrested.26 Yet Cardinal Ugo Pietro Spinola, a Legate of 
Bologna, asked for assurances from the commander of the Austrian troops 
in Lombardy-Venetia, Marshal Joseph Radetzky, about a possible military 
intervention, and these assurances were given to him.27
The cardinals in Rome sought to associate the causes of the riots with 
the revolutionary storms that defined the Apennine Peninsula during 
these years. They thought that the rebels in the provinces were coope-
rating with their counterparts in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and 
that the territory of the Papal States served as a preparation ground for 
a large-scale uprising in this southern Italian country.28 They also argued 
that from the standpoint of Rome, these occasional riots in the provinces 
could not be avoided, as the liberal-national groups represented a wide 
network interwoven with the whole peninsula: “For the Papal government, 
all means are certainly used to paralyze the effects of the incessant manoeuvers of 
the factious to increasingly break their plots; to which the adopted system of doing 
political trials from time to time is very beneficial, from which the good of knowing 
largely the personnel of the factious, and their plans, was also observed, besides 
the aforementioned advantage of trimming sectarian plots. […] But what good 
is it that a single government acts untiringly to prevent an evil that is general and 
24 Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 31. 1. 1844, ASV, Vienna 281Q. On the composition of 
the papal troops, including mercenaries in the service of the Pope and to the Pope’s 
loyal subject, see A. J. REINERMAN, The Failure of Popular Counter-Revolution in 
Risorgimento Italy: The Case of the Centurions, 1831–1847, in: Historical Journal, 34, 
1, 1991, pp. 21–41.
25 U. MARCELLI, Le vicende politiche, in: M. GAVELLI – F. TAROZZI (eds.), Negli anni 
della Restaurazione, Bologna 2000, p. 21; U. MARCELLI, Le vicende politiche dalla 
Restaurazione alle annessioni, in: A. BERSELLI (ed.), Storia della Emilia Romagna, 3, 
Imola 1980, p. 84.
26 Ohms to Metternich, Rome, 8. 8. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.
27 Altieri to Lambruschini, Vienna, 20. 8. 1843 and 8. 9. 43, ASV, Vienna 280F.
28 Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 14. 10. 1843, ASV, Vienna 281P.
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has roots where its power does not extend?“ 29 This is how Secretary of State 
Lambruschini expressed to the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, Lodovico Altieri, 
the powerlessness of the Roman government against the insurgents. He 
also believed that it was in the vital interests of the conservative powers 
to resolve the situation on the peninsula, and that Austria in particular 
should increase its influence and establish more surveillance in Tuscany 
– especially over the port of Livorno, which Lambruschini considered to 
be the main transhipment point of the correspondence of Italian liberals 
and nationalists. At the same time, however, he praised Austria’s energy 
in the fight against future “evils”.30
Although the riots in the Papal States in the summer of 1843 were one 
of many anti-regime upheavals during the 1840s in Italy, the Austrian 
chancellor was entirely convinced about the roots of these events, namely 
that they were due to the inability of the papal government to manage 
its secular power and properly administer its territory.31 Aware of the 
worthlessness of providing further advice on the administration of the 
Papal States and the need for reforms, he only assured the government 
in Rome of the readiness of Austria and its troops in Lombardy-Venetia 
to intervene at any time on papal territory if necessary. He entrusted the 
Austrian Ambassador Rudolf von Lützow with the task of informing the 
Secretary of State of the need for increased vigilance on the part of the 
Austrian administration in Lombardy-Venetia, and recommended doing 
the same for local authorities in the papal provinces as well as for the Ro-
man government, in order to provide them with all the means necessary 
to suppress revolutionary activities. Metternich did not want the past to 
repeat itself; he did not want Austrian military intervention to recur in 
the Papal States, as it would not be a welcome course on the European 
international scene for Austria. If Austrian intervention was about to take 
place, then it should only be with the consent of the Pope, as was the case 
in 1831–1832. In any case, Metternich’s view of intervention was constant 
throughout his diplomatic career, and it was reluctantly resorted to when, 
in his opinion, “foreign aid is the last resource, which it reserves for the case where 
the other means are manifestly insufficient”.32
29 Lambruschini to Altieri, Rome, 14. 10. 1843, ASV, Vienna 281P.
30 Ibid.
31 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 25. 2. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.
32 Metternich to Lützow, Königswart, 22. 8. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.
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For Austria, intervention would have been particularly dangerous 
given the situation at that time. If the events of 1831–1832 could be 
considered major crises, then Austrian intervention in the 1840s would 
have been a serious threat with the potential consequence of the outbreak 
of general war between Austria and France (since tense relations ruled 
between Paris and Vienna due to their influence in Italian affairs). When 
Metternich informed the government in Paris that he would not hesitate 
to provide assistance if any of the Italian rulers asked Austria to do so, the 
French Foreign Minister François Guizot replied that he believed that 
the intervention would not happen, and that he was convinced that the 
papal government could handle a few hundred insurgents without more 
foreign support.33
In general, the most important issue for Metternich was that anti-
regime activities do not cross the Austrian border, which would certainly 
threaten Austrian possessions on the peninsula, and that the political-
social situation in Lombardy and Venetia remain calm. This was also one 
of the reasons why, when asked by the papal government, he refused to 
relocate some of the insurgents to Ferrara, where Austria had deployed 
its troops according to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna from 1815. 
He feared not only the presence of rebels so close to Austrian territory, 
and the resulting danger of unrest, but also the risk that revolutionaries 
would use this act to promote even more anti-Austrian sentiment than 
already existed.34
Serious maladministration of the Papal States continued in the years 
to come; in comparison to other (Italian) states the papal regime was 
cumbersome, unfair, repressive, and represented only by ecclesiastical 
dignitaries, not allowing the growing bourgeoisie to share in the state 
administration, let alone in the decision-making process.35 That is why 
only two years went by before the liberal-nationalist groups once again 
sent a strong message to Rome about their dissatisfaction with the 
government. On the evening of 23rd September 1843, a group of men 
from Romagna, led by Pietro Renzi, decided to act by occupying several 
important government buildings in Rimini, disarming the city guards and 
33 Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 2. 10. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen 
(henceforth: StA), Frankreich 327.
34 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 21. 10. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68; Lambruschi-
ni to Altieri, Rome, 26. 10. 1843, ASV, Vienna 281P.
35 S. MATSUMOTO-BEST, Britain and the Papacy in the Age of Revolution: 1846–1851, 
Martlesham 2003, p. 24.
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taking them hostage. In a short time, the whole city was under the control 
of the rebels, and a provisional government chaired by Renzi was estab-
lished. This situation lasted only three days, when on 27th September, 
papal units reinforced by Swiss troops arrived in Rimini, and the liberals 
were forced to flee. Some of them took refuge in San Marino, others fled 
to Tuscany, where they stayed or continued on into France, and some 
managed to escape across the Adriatic Sea.36
This short rebellion, which was isolated in the town of Rimini – though 
there were other minor uprisings in other parts of the province – could 
be compared to the riots in the summer of 1843. However, there are 
two significant differences between these two occasions: Firstly, Pietro 
Renzi printed and spread a work of Luigi Carlo Farini called Manifesto 
delle popolazioni dello Stato Romano ai Principi ed ai popoli d’Europa (Manifesto 
of the Population of the Roman State to the Princes and Peoples of Europe).37 In this 
so-called Manifesto di Rimini, Farini advocates reforms in the Papal States, 
with explicit reference to the Memorandum of the Powers from 1831, 
while denouncing papal policy from the Motu Proprio of 1816 until his 
time – the politics of unfulfilled promises to improve bad governance and 
the state administration. In conclusion, he addressed twelve demands to 
the Pope, including full and general amnesty for all political prisoners, 
modern civil and criminal codes, establishment of municipal councils in 
the provinces, establishment of the Supreme Council of State in Rome, 
opening of all civil, military and judicial posts to the laity, departure of 
foreign troops, establishment of a civic guard, and more.38
Secondly, this small uprising became a major event, with popular-
ity both across the Italian peninsula and throughout Europe, as it was 
discussed in the work Degli ultimi casi di Romagna (About the recent events 
in Romagna) by Massimo d’Azeglio. He was a Piedmontese liberal who 
travelled through the northern part of the Papal States in September 
1845, witnessed the events in Rimini and observed the true state of the 
papal administration.39 Along with the publication of his work a year 
later, liberal activities, not only in the Papal States, were given a new 
dimension. From that point on, they ceased to be conspiratorial and 
36 Lambruschini to Viale-Prelá, Rome, 27. 9. 1845, 29. 9. 1845, 4. 10. 1845, ASV, Vienna 
327 VIII.
37 Lambruschini to Viale-Prelá, Rome, 20. 11. 1845, ASV, Vienna 327 VIII; F. J. COPPA, 
pp. 19–20.
38 L. C. FARINI, Lo stato romano dall’anno 1815 al 1850, Rome 1851, pp. 126–129.
39 M. D’AZEGLIO, Degli ultimi casi di Romagna, Lugano 1846.
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became a completely public, widely known struggle against “tyranni-
cal” governments. With d’Azeglio’s work and its publication in various 
foreign newspapers, the poor conditions of people in the Papal States 
were brought to the attention of all European intellectuals, as well as all 
diplomatic representatives and courts.
The response of the papal government was predictable, as the aging 
and reactionary Gregory XVI did not intend to change the direction of 
his policy, and most cardinals in Rome considered the events in Rimini 
as another common attempt to overthrow the central government. In 
a letter to the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, Secretary of State Lambruschini 
spoke of the Manifesto of Rimini as “full of insults and sarcasm against the Papal 
government”, equating the ideas of liberals with “perverse principles”.40 For 
Metternich, who could still be regarded as the driving force of Austria’s 
foreign policy, the case of Rimini was different compared to previous up-
risings in the State of the Church. The aspect that distinguished these riots 
from previous ones was, in the chancellor’s view, the nature of the rebels’ 
demands: they did not want to secede from the central government or 
depose the Pope. This time, he regarded the actors from Rimini as “reform-
ers of the government”, who did not wish to destroy the Papacy but merely 
express their proposals for government and administrative reforms.41 As if 
for the first time in his Italian politics in the pre-March period, Metternich 
sympathized with the rebels, understood their demands and approved 
the means with which they wanted to achieve them. After the events in 
Rimini, he wrote to Lützow in Rome and mentioned reforms of the papal 
regime: “You know our opinion on this matter, Monsignor the Ambassador; You 
know that, in our opinion, major reforms in almost all branches of the public service 
are inevitable and desirable.”42
Tired of thirty years of anti-reformist and, for him personally, unsuccess-
ful developments in the Papal States, Metternich seemed to understand 
in a certain way the behaviour of the population. In his correspondence 
he even defended their actions, writing to Lützow: “They [the insurgents] 
have managed, to a certain extent, to maintain public peace. […] they respected 
the particular properties; they have punished some opponents of their benign views 
of reform; in all that there is a background of respect for the public feeling.”43 
40 Lambruschini to Viale-Prelá, Rome, 20. 11. 1845 and 11. 3. 1846, ASV, Vienna 327 VIII.
41 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 5. 10. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.
42 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 25. 10. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.
43 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 5. 10. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.
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The chancellor also mentioned that the rebels had seized the govern-
ment’s coffers, but again, he considered this act understandable as, in his 
opinion, “a reform also needs the nervus rerum”.44 For him, two conclusions 
emerged from these actions: firstly, that the violent revolution was not 
successful in Italian conditions; and secondly, that these activities and the 
related reform program still did not have the necessary support among 
the population.45
After this brief rebellion, the papal government asked Austria to send 
the Imperial Navy to observe the papal coast. This request for surveillance 
was granted by Austria, which also reinforced its garrison in Ferrara. 
Again, as two years ago, Metternich reassured the Roman government of 
Austrian military assistance if circumstances warranted it, and the Pope 
would officially asked for it.46
It is difficult to predict in what direction Austro-papal relations would 
have tended in the years to come, had there been no major events in the 
years after 1845. If an ultraconservative Pope like Gregory XVI would 
have still occupied the Quirinal, then Metternich would probably have 
continued his course as a passive observer and guardian of papal sover-
eignty in times of crisis. However, the political constellation and social 
development of Europe in the mid-19th century suggested that it would 
be a different story. Metternich, of course, was well informed about the 
situation on the Apennine Peninsula in the second half of the 1840s, and 
was therefore also aware of the ongoing evolution of the Italian liberal-
national movement, which transformed itself from the secret, radical 
activities of Young Italy to an official, moderate political agitation in the 
Italian states. As early as 1843, when Vincenzo Gioberti published his 
work Del primato morale e civile degli italiani (On the Moral and Civil Primacy 
of the Italians), in which this Piedmontese clergyman presented his ideas 
on the political structure of Italy in the form of a federation headed by 
the Pope, Metternich commented on the genesis of Italian moderate 
nationalism as follows: “In my account, I do not look at Mazzini as the man that is 
the most to be feared; the Republic will find, I think, fewer partisans in the influential 
classes in Italy. The Federazione, which aims at a Monarchical and Constitutional 
Unit, has, in my opinion, more chances to stir people than Giovine Italia…”47
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 5. 10. 1845 and 9. 12. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.
47 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 21. 10. 1843, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 68.
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The Austrian Chancellor, who celebrated his 73rd birthday in 1846, 
marked the 1840s as a “transitional era”.48 “The world, dear Count, is 
a very ridiculous shop. There is everything, and the choice depends on the govern-
ments” – thus did Metternich express his personal feelings in a letter to 
the Austrian ambassador in Rome at the end of 1845.49 Indeed, various 
ideological struggles rocking Europe before 1848 shook the Italian 
peninsula as well, especially the political-social situation in the Kingdom 
of Sardinia and the Papal States. The Roman Government, represented 
by the ultraconservative Pope Gregory XVI and like-minded Secretary of 
State Lambruschini, responded unambiguously to political agendas that 
were new at that time, rejecting all liberal, democratic and nationalist 
ideas. Even in matters such as the construction of railways in the Papal 
States, the Pope strongly opposed their implementation, fearing that the 
expansion of trade associated with rail transportation would also bring 
about the dissemination of liberal ideas.50 A total misunderstanding 
of the people’s needs in the mid-19th century (regarding the political, 
social and industrial developments) on the part of the papal government 
manifested itself in the population’s dissatisfaction, particularly in the 
northern provinces, and was the cause of tension and recurring unrest 
in society.
In the case of the Papal States, Metternich fully understood the discon- 
tent among papal subjects; he had put a tremendous amount of effort 
into defending the Papacy and its temporal power through, among other 
things, a lifelong search for reforms of the papal regime that would satisfy 
the population. Europe around 1845, however, was different from what 
he used to know. And, as already mentioned above, he was aware that the 
world was changing, perhaps not only awaiting the bright future that, 
according to liberals and nationalists, progress should bring. He shed 
more light on his opinion of these changes by writing to Lützow: “The 
movement which agitates the world draws its cause from a struggle against the truth 
and the lie, between the rules of a consummated experience, and fantastic  trials. 
Will the world perish because of the moral struggle in which it is engaged? […] 
the risk that the social body runs is that of displacement in the moral and material 
sphere and of a return to the worst of barbarities, that which is covered by a false 
48 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 29. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.
49 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 28. 12. 1845, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 72.
50 Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 16. 11. 1844, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 69.
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semblance of progress.”51 He feared that history would repeat itself, and that 
in the name of progress, the horrors and terror of the French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic Wars, which he remembered from his youth, would 
reappear. His fears were confirmed when, in 1848, Europe was devoured 
by revolutions, and Austria entered a war with the Kingdom of Sardinia.52
Before that, however, Austro-papal relations were to experience a tur-
bulent development that Metternich himself could not have predicted. 
Gregory XVI died on 1st June 1846, and the cardinals gathered in Rome to 
elect a new head of the Church. They were aware of the unstable – without 
the Pope even dangerous – situation both in the Papal States and through-
out the peninsula. Therefore, the conclave was conducted comparatively 
quickly (it lasted only two days) and, after only two weeks, on 16th June 
1846, the new successor of St. Peter was elected: Giovanni Mastai Ferretti. 
As the bishop of Imola, he knew the conditions in the Legations; he had 
even been a target of the insurgents in 1843, and now he was becoming 
Pope Pius IX.53 If Gregory XVI was considered a conservative Pope 
who prevented any progress, then his successor could be described as 
a “liberal” one, and therefore his election was a fatal blow to Austro-papal 
relations. The election of Mastai Ferretti as the new Pope was not only 
celebrated across the Papal States; the new Pontiff was also regarded by 
neoguelfists as a long-awaited ideal ruler, sparking the hope of fulfilling 
Gioberti’s dreams of a unified Italy under the leadership of the Pope.54
Following the Pope’s nomination of new Secretary of State Tommaso 
Pasquale Gizzi, the Legate of Forli and a popular figure considered by 
the public to be a moderate reformist, it became clear that internal 
papal politics would not follow a conservative line, as in the preceding 
decades.55 The new Pope did not disappoint the Italian liberals and 
proceeded quite briskly with his innovative political agenda. At the end of 
the first month of his reign he declared a general amnesty, giving virtually 
all political exiles the opportunity to return to their homeland. In the 
spring of the following year he established the Council of State, which 
was to be responsible for finance and administration, already foreseen 
in the Memorandum of the Powers of 1831. In early July 1847, Pius IX 
approved the creation of the Civic Guard, which represented truly Italian 
51 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 29. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.
52 COPPA, p. 37.
53 Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 17. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 73.
54 BERKELEY, p. 276; ŠEDIVÝ, The Decline of the Congress System, p. 191.
55 Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 25. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 73.
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militias, unlike the Popes’ centuries-long practice of using the services 
of mercenary troops to defend their territory. Finally, in the wake of 
constitutional processes in other Italian states, the Pope also guaranteed 
his subjects a constitution in mid-March 1848.56
Metternich was very pleased with the relatively prompt election of the 
new Pope, being aware of the risks posed by the interregnum, especially in 
the situation full of disorders that prevailed in the State of the Church.57 
He considered the election of Mastai Ferretti as the new Pope to be good 
news. In letters to the Austrian ambassador, he assessed his personality as 
appropriate for the leadership of the Catholic Church, as well as for the 
government of the Papal States: “The most worthy advantages of the solicitude 
of good men are met with in him. The place of the first moral authority is once again 
filled by an individuality which gathers all the voices…”58 And he confirmed 
the acceptability of Pius IX for Austria by claiming that “…what, only a few 
moments ago, had formed the object of our wishes, is accomplished”.59 The 
chancellor’s expectations were that Pius IX, considered to be a liberal, 
moderate reformist, would take the wind out of the sails of the political 
radicals and supporters of the unified Italian state.60 At this time he had 
no idea how far the Roman government would be willing to go in its 
reform program to meet the demands of the liberals, and thus stabilize 
the political and social situation in the Papal States. 
Metternich was convinced that the conservative course of papal 
policy could be maintained if the reforms he had been recommending for 
decades were implemented. At the same time, by continuing moderate 
politics, Rome would not make room for political agendas that were 
focused on destroying the political order.61 Moreover, given the relatively 
young age of Mastai Ferretti, Metternich assumed that his long papal 
career would allow a proper long-lasting government.62 However, it must 
be said that the Austrian chancellor himself, in his advanced age, ceased to 
be sensitive to the needs of the society at that time, and instead adhered 
56 ŠEDIVÝ, The Decline of the Congress System, pp. 193, 201, 221.
57 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 9. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74. Austria even 
reinforced its army in Lombardy-Venetia due to the turbulent situation in neighbour-
ing Italian states, ibid.
58 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 23. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.
59 Ibid.
60 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 28. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.
61 Ibid.
62 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 29. 6. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.
184
West Bohemian Historical Review X | 2020 | 2
to outdated principles that might have been appropriate twenty or thirty 
years earlier, but not in the political-social climate dominating the years 
before 1848.
Based on information from Lützow, who had his first audience with 
the new Pope in early July, Metternich had a good insight into what first 
steps Pius IX was going to take.63 In response, he summed up for the 
Austrian ambassador, and for Pius IX, suggestions, which according to 
the Chancellor were “the product of the progress of my [Metternich’s] mind 
and my experience in the conduct of public affairs”.64 These three well-known 
apercus touched upon the issues of form of government, amnesty and 
concessions. Metternich emphasized that there is an essential difference 
between government and state administration; in his conservative 
opinion and in favour of absolutism, the government must always be 
exercised in the centre, whereas it is appropriate to hand over the state 
administration to different levels of the state structure. As for the amnesty 
that Pius IX had planned as his first act on the papal throne, the Chancel-
lor clearly explained that “any act of amnesty is an act of forgiveness and cannot 
be anything else”, highlighting the true meaning of amnesty, which nullifies 
the consequences of a fault but not the fault itself. In the last part, he 
focused on the (non-)importance of concessions, which he considered an 
act of justice and prudence, and an act of a good government only if they 
are not made by the Throne to the governed, since they are processes of 
reason and duty. In Metternich’s view, a government that makes conces-
sions is following a line of weakness, a line of renunciation of a right.65
Not all his efforts, however, fell on fertile ground, when Pius IX declared 
a general amnesty in mid-July. Already at this point it was clear that the 
new Pope, unlike his predecessors, would not listen to the advice coming 
from Vienna. This was due not only to the Pope’s political attitude, but 
also to France’s increased and still increasing influence in Rome.66 It was 
63 Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 3. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 73.
64 Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 12. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.
65 Annex to Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 12. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74; 
R. METTERNICH-WINNEBURG (ed.), Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren, Vol. 7, 
Wien 1883, pp. 246–252.
66 France’s influence in Rome grew mainly because of the deployment of an Italian 
Pellegrino Rossi as the French ambassador to the Papal States in 1845; Pius IX favored 
most of his advice. F. ENGEL-JANOSI, French and Austrian Political Advice to Pius IX 
1846–1848, in: The Catholic Historical Review, 38, 1, 1952, pp. 1–20; ŠEDIVÝ, The Decline 
of the Congress System, p. 194.
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understandable that the new Pope, in a situation of open opposition to 
Austria among the Italian population, including the subjects in the Papal 
States, would not follow instructions from Metternich. He himself wanted 
to rule as an independent sovereign, free of all foreign influence. When 
the Austrian ambassador Lützow felt himself isolated in Rome, the only 
thing the Austrian Chancellor could do at that moment was to take the 
position of observing bystander.67
Over the next few months, Austro-papal relations cooled significantly, 
and the Roman Government followed a liberal reform course, listening 
to the government in Paris rather than the one in Vienna. Metternich 
closely followed the changing situation in the Papal States, both at 
the governmental level in Rome and regarding social conditions in the 
provinces. Once the amnesty was guaranteed, he wrote: “It is remarkable 
that such general enthusiasm has manifested itself in Rome, where very few families 
will benefit from sovereign clemency; if the public joy is witnessed in proportion to 
the advantage which the populations find in this measure, this joy will have to be 
immoderate in the Legations and the Marches.“68 The old statesman had no 
illusions that celebrations in the streets of the capital, as well as elsewhere, 
were not only the result of the Pope’s liberal action, but were also a prod-
uct of the more general climate dominating the Apennine Peninsula in 
those years. Metternich evaluated Pius’ work clearly: “Without doubt the 
administration of the State of the Church needs more than one improvement, but it 
is not these benefits that the spirits of St. Peter hold in view; they aim at pretending 
reforms which in reality are only works of perdition.”69
Undoubtedly, Pius’ actions went far beyond what Metternich had sug-
gested in his apercus or his reform programs during the previous decades. 
But the final blow to his papal politics was yet to come. If in the early 
1840s resistance to Austria touched upon only a limited part of Italian 
society, then, after 1845, anti-Austrian sentiments were an integral part 
of Italian society, affecting virtually the entire population. In particular, 
Italian nationalists and patriots, who emphasized in their works the 
need to eliminate foreign influences on the peninsula if Italian unity was 
to be achieved, had the greatest credit for it.70 A wave of anti-Austrian 
sentiment did not spare the Papal States, and Pius IX had no difficulty 
67 Lützow to Metternich, Rome, 29. 8. 1847, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 76.
68 Metternich to Lützow, Königswart, 31. 7. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 74.
69 Ibid.
70 ŠEDIVÝ, The Decline of the Congress System, p. 26.
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in using anti-Austrian rhetoric. On the contrary, he himself used these 
conditions for his own benefit, in order to gain popularity among his 
subjects.71 In this respect, he had been successful from the very beginning 
of his pontificate, especially since the summer of 1847, when Marshal Ra-
detzky had reinforced the Austrian garrison in the town of Ferrara on the 
border of Austria and the Papal States.72 Given the circumstances at that 
time – as Lützow’s assistant Ohms wrote from Rome in the fall of 1846: 
“There reigns a real anarchy on several points of the Pontifical Provinces”73 – this 
was an understandable move, where the Austrian Marshal only protected 
his soldiers deployed in Ferrara from a possible attack by the Italians. The 
probability of a conflict between two foreign armies was high, especially 
after the creation of the Civic Guard.74
However, this act was received with strong disapproval in Italian circles. 
The Pope issued an official protest claiming that this action was illegal, 
and demanded that Austria reduces its troop levels in Ferrara to their 
original number.75 The fact that the reinforcement of the Austrian troops 
was in full compliance with the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and 
thus fully compatible with international law, had no significance for the 
whole affair.76 Not only Italian nationalists, but also some Italian rulers 
considered this action to be a regular occupation and an attempt by 
Austria to increase its influence in the Papal States.77 In the context of 
Austro-papal relations, this affair was the last nail in the coffin when it 
comes to relations between Rome and Vienna. From that moment on, the 
Austrian ambassador at the papal court was practically persona non grata, 
since he had only a few opportunities to meet the Pope before he left his 
office in May 1848.78
71 Ibid., pp. 191, 193, 195, 207.
72 A. SKED, Poor intelligence, flawed results. Metternich, Radetzky, and the crisis-
management of Austria’s “occupation” of Ferrara in 1847, in: P. JACKSON – J. SIEGEL 
(eds.), Intelligence and Statecraft. The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, 
Westport 2005, pp. 53–86.
73 Ohms to Metternich, Rome, 28. 11. 1846, OeStA, HHStA, StK Rom 75.
74 M. ŠEDIVÝ, The Austrian “occupation” of Ferrara in 1847. Its legal aspect between 
myth and reality, in: Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 23, 2, 2018, p. 142.
75 Ferretti to Viale-Prelá, Rome, 21. 8. 1847, 18. 9. 1847, 25. 9. 1847 and 6. 11. 1847, 
ASV, Vienna 328IX; Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 19. 8. 1847, OeStA, HHStA, StK 
Rom 82; ENGEL-JANOSI, Die politische Korrespondenz, pp. 224–225.
76 ŠEDIVÝ, The Austrian “occupation” of Ferrara, pp. 139–155.
77 ŠEDIVÝ, The Decline of the Congress System, pp. 218–219.
78 F. ENGEL-JANOSI, Österreich und der Vatikan 1846–1918, Vol. 1, Graz, Wien, Köln, p. 39.
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The so-called Austrian “occupation” of Ferrara not only had a chilling 
effect on Austro-papal relations, but also caused a strong upheaval in 
Austria’s already weak position on the Apennine Peninsula. This event 
was used by Italian nationalists and politicians in their struggle to expel 
the Austrians from the peninsula, even though they basically relied on 
false claims. All Italian newspapers, including the newly established, 
more nationalist-oriented ones, reported the event as an attack against 
the head of the Catholic Church and an independent sovereign.79 By 
abolishing censorship of the press, the Pope also indirectly supported 
anti-Austrian sentiments in the Papal States; together with his role as an 
innocent victim, this made him even more popular. Metternich had no 
further influence on the development of Austro-papal relations when, in 
mid-March 1848, he himself became a victim of revolutionary forces in 
his own country and was forced to leave Vienna. A few months later, in 
November 1848, Pius IX met the same fate and had to flee from the angry 
crowds in the streets of Rome.80 The two main figures of Austro-papal 
relations lost all their powers and the political order began to collapse, 
thus opening the path to a new war in Europe, not surprisingly in Italy.
Conclusion
For Metternich, the relations with the Papal States and the Pope as head 
of the Catholic Church had always been an important element of Austrian 
foreign policy. Until at least 1846, all the Popes were conservative to ultra-
conservative, and the Austrian Chancellor could use this fact to promote 
conservatism both in Austria and throughout Europe, as well as count on 
the support of the Holy See in disputes between liberal and conservative 
states. The conservative nature of the papal government was also an ef-
ficient tool for Metternich in the fight against revolutions, as confirmed 
several times during revolutionary events on the Apennine Peninsula in 
the period 1815–1848. Therefore, the stability of the temporal power 
of the Pope, not only as a spiritual leader but also as a secular ruler of 
the second-largest Italian state, was of great importance to him. Last 
but not least, cooperation between Vienna and Rome was important to 
maintaining Austrian dominance on the Apennine Peninsula, either by 
79 The Austrian annexation of Krakow in 1846, which was a clear violation of interna-
tional law, contributed significantly to the concerns of Italians, who feared that they 
would be caught by the same fate. ŠEDIVÝ, The Decline of the Congress System, pp. 6, 
203–209.
80 ENGEL-JANOSI, Österreich und der Vatikan, p. 41.
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preserving the political status quo in the Austrian provinces of Lombardy 
and Venetia, by eliminating revolutionary threats in neighbouring states, 
or by suppressing French ambitions in Italy through Austrian influence 
in the Eternal City.
However, the conservative (for most of the period, ultra-conservative) 
papal regime threatened the political stability of the Papal States when it 
was the worst-administered country on the peninsula, with a backward 
government apparatus entirely under the control of the Church. The 
fundamental crisis in 1831, when the decentralization tendencies of the 
northern provinces were ended only through Austrian military interven-
tion, changed nothing about this course of papal politics. When all 
Metternich’s efforts – beginning after the Congress of Vienna – to 
introduce reforms in the Papal States were shown to be completely in 
vain at the end of the 1830s, he resorted to the position of mere observer 
for the 1840s, with no intention of putting any pressure on the papal 
government. Yet when the local uprisings of 1843 and 1845 occurred, he 
was always ready to aid Rome, and assured the Pope of military support 
should he ask for it.
The growing Italian nationalism and the desire for a unified state, 
which, of course, did not exclude the Papal States (on the contrary, 
together with Piedmont they were the hatcheries of Italian patriots), did 
not greatly concern the Austrian Chancellor, as he still believed these 
political programs had little support among the Italian population. This 
changed radically in 1846 with the election of the new Pope Pius IX, who, 
considered to be politically liberal, represented a saviour for the papal 
subjects and a unifier of the Italian states for the Italian nationalists. For 
Austro-papal relations, the election of Pius IX dealt a fatal blow, since the 
Pope did not heed the caution received from Vienna that they were too 
conservative, and, over time, completely fixated himself on the French 
guidelines supporting his liberal path within the papal regime. The rein-
forcement of Austrian troops in Ferrara in July 1847 – regarded by Italians 
as well as by the Pope himself as an illegal occupation – provided input 
to even more aggravation of Austro-papal relations. This contributed to 
an even greater spread of anti-Austrian sentiments in Italian society. The 
deterioration in Austro-papal relations was one aspect of the failure of 
Metternich’s Italian policy and of the decline of Austrian dominance on 
the peninsula, leading ultimately to revolutionary storms and a declara-
tion of war between the Kingdom of Sardinia and Austria.
